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CASE COMMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WHAT IS A COMPENSABLE
DISEASE?
Deceased was transferred by his employer to slagging molten
metal within a few feet of molds containing liquid steel. He had
been doing this work, blowing slag off the molds with compressed
air, a few hours when he became ill of heatstroke. He died a short
time later. The heat where he had been working was so intense his
face and hands were blistered. The Court of Appeals affirmed an
award to his widow holding heatstroke to be a personal injury by
accident within the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Wolfe
v. Armco, 277 Ky. 395, 126 S. W. (2d) 835 (1939).
The relevant provision of the Act2 follows: "This Act... shall affect
the liability of employers subject thereto to their employees for personal Injuries ...
by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment, or for death resulting from such accidental injury,
3
provided htowever, that personal injury by accident . . . shall not
include diseases except3 where the disease is the natural and direct
result of a traumatic injury by accident . . ."
"For a claimant to be entitled to an award under this act there
must be found a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment. If the injury is not a disease, and most
of them are not, the case ends there as far as the provision cited is
concerned. If it is a disease, it must be the natural and direct result
of a traumatic injury by accident. However, the opinion in a disease case should not begin with a discussion of 'traumatic' as so many
of them do."' An analysis of the procedure which should be followed
In applying the Act follows:
I.

Is there a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment? If not, there should be no
award.
A. If the answer to "I" is "yes", is the personal injury a disease? If not there should be an award so far as this provision is concerned.
1. If the answer to "A" is "yes", is the disease the
natural and direct result of a traumatic injury by
accident? If the answer to this is "yes", there should
be an award so far as this provision is concerned.
If "no" there should be no award.
'-Baldwin's Ky. Stat. (1936), sec. 4880 et seq.
2
Stpra n. 1.
*Italics added.
'Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 194 Ky. 684, 247 S. W. 973 (1923);
Wallin Creek Collieries v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 S. W. 234 (1925);
Smith v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 806 (1925);
Ashland Limestone Co. v. Wright, 219 Ky. 691, 294 S. W. 159 (1927);
Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Hunt, 221 Ky. 265, 298 S. W. 686 (1927).
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It is a common error of the Court of Appeals and writers on the
Act to apply part "A" of the above analysis as though it were in the
5
alternative with "1".
In this they err. These provisions are not correlative. The requirement is not a personal injury or a traumatic
injury by accident in the case of disease. That the phrases concerning
disease are a limitation on the definition of personal injury is shown
by the words "provided however" which precede the exception.
The analysis supra should be applied in its entirety and In the
order in which it is given to each compensation case where section 4880
is involved. Under it the court can not evade the question of disease
as it attempts to do in the instant case. If claimant's personal injury
is a disease which is not the result of a traumatic injury by accident,
there should be no award under the Act. This does not mean claimant
is denied relief, for he has an action at law.6 The case of The Great
Atlantic and Pacic Tea Co. v. SextonW is an example of the correct
application of the Act.
The provision that diseases must be the result of a traumatic
injury by accident to be compensable causes much difficulty.$ The
problem is the meaning of "traumatic injury". The text book definition,
"a traumatic injury is one caused to the body by violence",' Is not
satisfactory. How much violence does this definition require? When
do we have an injury? Soon after the Act was passed the violence
would have to have been great to cause a traumatic injury. More
recent cases seem to be departing from that requirement and postulating a metaphysical, as distinguished from the ordinary, meaning of
"violence" and "injury".
The first definition of "traumatic" was made in the case of Je~lco
Coal Co. v. Adkins. 10 There claimant's disease, Inflammation of the
heart, was caused by the inhalation of bad air in a mine. The court,
in refusing compensation, defined "traumatic" as follows: A traumatic
injury requires some external physical force directed against the body
of the claimant. Professor Moreland criticises that decision," and since
the court seems to have adopted his view, it is perhaps advisable to
quote him extensively.
5Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 194 Ky. 684, 247 S. W. 973 (1923);
Wallin Creek Collieries v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 S. W. 234 (1925);
Smith v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 806 (1925);
Ashland Limestone Co. v. Wright, 219 Ky. 691, 294 S. W. 159 (1927);
Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Hunt, 221 Ky. 265, 298 S. W. 686 (1927);
Roy Moreland, General Development of Workmen's Compensation
Acts, (1925) 13 Ky. L. J. 20, 94 200 (This is the outstanding work on
the Ky. Act.); Note, (1928) 16 Ky. L. T. 254.
3.ellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 194 Ky. 684, 247 S. W. 973 (1923).
'242 Ky. 266, 46 S. W. (2d) 87 (1932).
$Kentucky is the only state having that provision in its compensation act.
'Dosker, Manuel of Compensation Law (1917), sec. 82.
194 IKy. 684, 247 S. W. 973 (1923). Cited with approval in Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Kerr, 203 Ky. 804, 263 S. W. 342 (1924).
n Moreland, suzpra note 5, at 206.
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"This decision places a narrow construction upon the word
'traumatic'. The impact of a germ upon the integrity of the
claimant's body, a blow which, though microscopically minute,
produces an immediate effect may well be held to be a 'traumatic
injury'.
"Where one is injured by foul air and gases in a mine, some
external, physical force has actually been directed against the body."
The definition in the Jellico Coal Co. case was described as requirIng an abnormal condition of the human body produced by external
violence in Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Hunt.? There was no necessity
to limit the degree of violence in this case. The disease was caused by
a fall and was clearly traumatic. A similar case is the one in which
claimant's disease was caused by being struck on the head by a falling
rock as he worked in a quarry." In both the preceding cases there was
a compensable personal injury and a disease which was also compensable caused by the personal injury. There was no problem in the
definition of "traumatic" since the injury was obviously so.
However, the problem is not always so easy to solve. Heatstroke
and sunstroke cases present two difficulties: (1) are they diseases? and
(2) If they are diseases, are they the result of a traumatic injury?
14
Heatstroke has been held to be a disease. Since it is a disease, the
test of a traumatic injury must be applied. This has been answered
in the negative by Smith v. Standard Mfg. Co." which denied recovery
under the Act. It has been suggested that the force due to the heat
makes the injury traumatic." The instant case is distinguished from
the Standard case on the direct exposure to intense artificial heat in
the instant case. This was absent in the Standard case. Sunstroke is
not a disease," and is compensable under the analysis supra as a personal injury.
The reasoning in Professor Moreland's article seems to have been
the basis for the decision in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Sexton. In that case tularemia caused by germs entering cuts on
claimant's hands while he was dressing rabbits was held compensable
as a disease caused by a traumatic injury. He did not acquire the cuts
in the course of his employment, but while he was splitting kindling,
presumably at home. The reasoning in the case is similar to that
under which Professor Moreland would allow compensation. The word
"traumatic" was held not to be limited to physical force in the sense
of a blow, a current of electricity, or like terms implying power,
vigor, violence, or injury in the commonly accepted meaning of the
term. It was held to include any independent influence or causes
external to the body coming into contact with and causing injury to
1"221 Ky. 265, 298 S. W. 686 (1927).
"Ashland Limestone Co. v. Wright, 219 Ky. 691, 294 S. W. 159
(1927).
31Smith v. Standard Mfg. Co., 211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 234 (1925).
"211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 234 (1925).
26Note (1928) 16 Ky. L. J. 254.
2'Paist v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 54 F. (2d) 393 (1931); see
Wolfe v. Armco, 277 Ky. 395, 126 S. W. (2d) 835, 836 (1939).
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the physical structure thereof. This decision seems to let down the
bars for the compensation of any disease when the time and place of
its occurrence can be shown. The practical effect of the Sexton case is
to write out of the Act the express exclusion of diseases as compensable. Occupational diseases would still be not compensable due to
the interpretation of I supra, since they are not "by accident".,, If
such was the legislative intent, there would be no use for the exception,
and it would have been omitted.
The writer examines the word "injury" when confronted with the
facts of the Sexton case. An injury in the ordinary sense Is not produced by the falling of a germ which weighs a small fraction of an
ounce upon a man weighing many thousands of times more. However,
the test of a traumatic injury is not to be found in a comparison of
weights, nor is a practical legal problem to be solved by rarifled
philosophical reasoning. It is to be found in a reasonable meaning of
injury as used by the average man, limited by the word "traumatic".
The Sexton case, in its concern to find a trauma, loses sight of the
fact it must find an injury. In other words there must be an injury
before its cause is considered. The court errs in finding an injury
which results in a disease in the Sexton case. Using injury in its
ordinary sense makes each case rest on its own facts. If Sexton had
cut his finger while he was dressing the rabbits, driving tularemia
germs into his skin, there would be a traumatic injury causing the
disease, though the injury would probably not cause him to cease
working. If a blacksmith burns his fingers and blood poisoning results,
that should be a compensable disease. The definition of "traumatic" in
the Sexton case is fundamentally correct when "injury" is considered
in its ordinary sense.
In conclusion it is submitted that the Act should be applied as suggested in the outline. The court errs in beginning an opinion with a
discussion of trauma. The first part of an opinion should be concerned
with the personal injury by accident factor; the traumatic injury factor
should be treated at the end, and only when the personal injury by
accident is a disease. It is submitted that the provision about recovery
for disease has been held to include diseases which should not be
compensable. It should include only those diseases resulting from a
traumatic injury which can be called an injury in the usual, ordinary
meaning of the word. This would make most disease cases rest on
their own facts. The decision on existence or non-existence of a
traumatic injury would be left to the Workmen's Compensation Board,
and its decision would be as conslusive as if it were a finding of fact by
a jury.
J. PAUL CURx
CRIMINAL

LAW-THE DEADLY WEAPON DOCTRINE-THE
HANDS AS DEADLY WEAPONS
Defendant attacked his six-year-old nephew with his bare hands
and strangled him to death after having committed the crime of
2Moreland, supra note 5, at 200.

